to go on using terms like agarophobia, psychiatrists will have to accept that such psychosomatic states are aroused by varied environmental triggers that are unlikely to be genetically determined per se? A philosopher handed Sir Martin's essay on the classification of so-called mental disease would, I suspect, hand it back with the comment that though it sets out the orthodox view, the writer should try again with a more open mind and fewer prejudices (such as that against psychoanalysts).
The weather of the mind is as chaotic as the weather we meet with out of doors and can be disturbed by a single word amongst millions. It is time our psychiatric philosophers abandoned the search for understanding on a linear reductionist model and began to study the mathematics of chaos, which as Kaneka Kunihiko has pointed out, has its own kind of order.
The author replies below:
Professor Davis's commentary on some of the issues discussed in my paper expands into a sweeping and indiscriminate critique of contemporary psychiatric practice and theory. He proceeds to advance some aetiological theories of his own.
A modern textbook of psychiatry or a brief visit to the Department in Cambridge might disabuse him of the idea that the diagnoses from which classifications originate are derived from 'verbal evidence and inventories alone'.
My paper made no reference to psychoanalysis, but Professor Davis charges me with prejudice against it. I have recently paid tribute to Freud's contribution to understanding of the developmental and historical dimensions of human personality and the psychic disorders it may manifest'. He appears unaware that Freud was the first person to develop a taxonomy of the anxiety and phobic disorders. Its main features are clearly recognizable in contemporary classifications.
In an apparent determination to affix a 'reductionist' label, Davis has ignored the discussion of the role of personality factors in causation in the paper and the account of Andrews' psychotherapeutic regimen, which achieved impressive results in a large group of neurotic patients. A wide range of skills has to be deployed in the proper management of those with chronic neuroses. Davis's dismissal ofpharmacological treatments in psychiatry across the board lacks balance and discrimination. They have alleviated the sufferings of countless thousands of patients in communities of every kind and returned many to normal life. The efficacy of the main groups of compounds has been established by stringently controlled clinical trials conducted in all parts of the world. When Davis claims that there is no evidence for their efficacy, one is led to wonder whether he has examined any.
To claim as he does that there is no evidence to favour a hereditary contribution to psychiatric disorders is to ignore decades of endeavour devoted to studies of twins and to controlled investigations of children adopted, soon after they had been born to mentally-ill mothers. These enquiries have established some contribution by heredity to the causation of certain neuroses and other psychiatric disorders beyond reasonable doubt.
Having accused me of reductionism, Davis finds no incongruity in reviving the simplistic and obsolete notion (first mooted in 1884 by William James in relation to emotional states alone) that the sufferings of patients with neuroses and 'indeed the psychoses' stem in their entirety from perception in consciousness of the visceral effects of adrenaline. The advice that psychiatrists in search of inspiration should study the 'mathematics of chaos' appears paradoxical from someone opposed to reductionism. I fear that the powerful beam of darkness generated by involvement with arcane mathematical equations would be likely to obscure the improved lighting and the new signposts which have proved so beneficial for our difficult terrain in recent years. maintains that the COMA Report! underestimates sugar as a risk factor in obesity, diabetes and coronary heart disease. We contend that the Report overestimates sugar's role in dental caries. Specifically, regarding the statement that 'a reduction in consumption would be expected further to reduce the prevalence of dental caries in the UK', we deem sugar's contributory responsibility to be overdrawn'', The recent spectacular falls in caries occurrence have taken place with minimal changes in total diet, in sugar intake, or in snack frequency". Between 1963 and 1982, the mean DMFT score in 12-year-olds in Sydney, Australia, fell from 8.5 to 1.4 with no change in diet", If level of sugar intake be truly very important, then in any community, sub-groups of children in upper or lower tertiles or quartiles respecting sugar intake, should evince significant differences in caries experience. In some groups the difference was slight''; in others, absent, as in the adolescent group examined by Garn et al. 6 Such behaviour should temper confidence over the extent of benefit to be derived from sugar reduction.
In brief, certainly sugar has a role in dental caries. However, (i) we question whether sugar specifically merits the excessive blame accorded to it; (ii) we believe any fall in caries following sugar restriction say 20-25% is likely to be trivial, not substantial; (iii) if sugar restriction be linked with a rise in fat intake, as is likely, then the value of the changes advocated, in terms of total health, is nutritionally questionable. A R P WALKER Human Biochemistry Research Unit,
